Expert Opinions on What Happened - 1912

Is This What Happened? In All Probability, According to the Scientific American, a Massive, Projecting, Underwater Shelf of the Iceberg With Which She Collided Tore Open Several Compartments of the Titanic, the Rent Extending From Near the Bow to Amidships. The Energy of the Blow, 1,161,000 Foot Tons, Was Equal to That of the Combined Broadsides of the Battleships Delaware and North Dakota. © Scientific American. The Literary Digest (11 May 1912) p. 981. GGA Image ID # 10869441df

Introduction

The tragic sinking of the RMS Titanic in April 1912 has continued to spark debate and analysis from experts in engineering, maritime safety, and naval architecture. The article "Expert Opinions on What Happened - 1912" from The Literary Digest presents a collection of authoritative perspectives on what led to the disaster and how it could have been prevented. Experts such as Admiral Robert E. Peary, renowned polar explorer, and publications like Scientific American and Engineering News provide insights into the interplay of factors like iceberg conditions, ship speed, construction strength, and navigational decisions. The article critically examines the vulnerabilities of even the most advanced ships of the era and the limitations of contemporary safety measures, while also suggesting reforms that could mitigate such risks in the future. This collection of opinions underscores the urgent need for a comprehensive reevaluation of maritime practices and technologies to prevent a repeat of such a catastrophe.

While it is well to adopt many of the precautions and devices suggested since the iceberg sent the Titanic to the bottom, no less an authority on ice than Robert E. Peary reminds us that, after all, for the modern transatlantic liner, "there is no certain protection against icebergs except to give the region where they may occur the widest berth."

It likewise appears to Engineering News (New York) "that the first and most important lesson of the Titanic's loss is the need for moving the summer course of transatlantic steamers between North Atlantic ports and the English Channel ports farther south."

As our readers know, this was done at once by the joint action of the steamship companies. In connection with a chart showing the various" 'lanes," Engineering News goes on to say:

The position of the Titanic, as given in her calls for assistance by wireless, was Lat. 41° 46', Long. 50° 14'. It will be seen by referring to the chart that this was 14', or about 16 miles, south of the regular westbound summer route. The early reports that the Titanic was using the shorter northern or 'Winter way' — were erroneous.

"The general position of the group of icebergs upon one of which the liner was wrecked is indicated on the chart. The iceberg symbols on the chart mark positions at which icebergs were sighted by different vessels in the few days immediately preceding and following the wreck.

For clarity, the chart marks only a few of the numerous reports received at the New York Office of the United States Hydrographic Bureau.

"One can trace the course of the group of bergs to the southward under the influence of the Labrador current utilizing the pilot charts issued monthly by the Hydrographic Office.

The Labrador Current curves around the coast of Newfoundland and is believed to pass below the Gulf Stream. The ice brought by the current from the north is picked up by the Gulf Stream and carried slowly eastward, being rapidly melted as a general rule by the warmer water. This intricate interplay of ocean currents and temperatures is a key factor in the movement and melting of icebergs in the North Atlantic, and understanding it is crucial for safe navigation."

The speed of the Gulf Stream in this vicinity is only 15 or 20 miles per day. Slight variations in the flow of the two currents or differences in the character of the ice itself may account for the ice's further progress southward in some years.

"The ice this year is farther south than it has been during a long period of years, and on 16 April, the transatlantic lines announced an agreement, in consequence of the reports as to where in the Atlantic, to shift the established routes to bring them 60 or 70 miles farther south in the vicinity where the Titanic met icebergs. This proactive decision by the transatlantic lines is a testament to their commitment to ensuring the safety of modern transatlantic travel."

Repositioning Steamship Routes

Three days later, on 19 April, an agreement was effected between the steamship lines and the United States Hydrographic Office, moving the routes some 100 miles farther south to the position indicated on the chart reproduced herewith. The chart also shows the former routes, established in 1898. The new routes are about 175 miles longer than the former summer routes."

Chart of the North Atlantic Showing the New Summer Routes for Steamships. Inter Routes of German and French Lines Are Not Shown. The Turning Points Are the Same as for the English Lines. Small Open Circles indicate these Points. Shaded Spots show the position of Icebergs. © Engineering News. The Literary Digest (11 May 1912) p. 982. GGA Image ID # 1086b494ee

The sinking of the Titanic has convinced many that there is no such thing as "the unsinkable ship." Yet, as The Scientific American reminds us, "the ship's company who set sail from Southampton on the first and last voyage of the world's greatest vessel" had "many good reasons" for believing she was unsinkable.

The Purported Strength of Construction

We read a carefully prepared article in this authoritative weekly: "The ship's floor was of exceptional strength and stiffness. Keel, keelson, longitudinal, and inner and outer bottoms were of weight, size, and thickness exceeding any previous ship.

The floor was carried well up into the sides of the vessel. In addition to the conventional framing, the hull was stiffened by deep web frames — girders of enormous strength — spaced at frequent and regular intervals throughout the whole length of the vessel.

Tying the ship's sides together were the deck beams, ten inches in depth, covering a floor above the floor with unbroken steel decks. Additional strength was afforded by the thick longitudinal bulkheads of the coal bunkers, which extended in the wake of the boiler-rooms, and, incidentally, by their watertight construction, served, or instead, because of the loss of the ship, we should say it did as it was intended to do, to prevent water, which might enter through a rupture in the ship's outer shell, from finding its way into the boiler-rooms.

"As further protection against sinking, the Titanic was divided into sixteen separate watertight compartments by fifteen transverse bulkheads. They were so proportioned that the sea might have flooded any two of them without endangering the flotation of the ship.

"Furthermore, all the multitudinous compartments of the cellular double bottom and all the sixteen main compartments of the ship were connected, through an elaborate system of piping, with a series of powerful pumps whose collective capacity would suffice to delay the rise of water in the holds significantly, due to any of the ordinary accidents of the sea involving a rupture of the hull of the ship.

"Finally, there was the security against foundering due to vast size—a safeguard which might reasonably be considered the most effective. For it is certain that, with a given amount of damage to the hull, the flooding of one compartment will affect the stability of a ship in the inverse ratio of her size— or, should the watertight doors fail to close, the ship will stay afloat for a length of time approximately proportional to her size."

How the Steamship Lines Could Carry Lifeboats for All. on the Left, the Boat Deck of the Titanic Shows 20 Lifeboats Carrying About 1,000 Passengers. on the Right, the Plan for the Boat Deck Shows Suggested Accommodation for 56 Boats Carrying About 3,100 Passengers. © Scientific American. The Literary Digest (11 May 1912) p. 982. GGA Image ID # 1086a1115f

Speed and the Iceberg

Therefore, "unsinkable she was by any of the seemingly possible accidents of wind and weather or deep-sea collision." Bow on, and "under the half-speed called for by careful seamanship," she would probably have survived even a head-on collision with an iceberg. But there was one peril against which she was as helpless as the smallest coasting steamers— "the long, glancing blow below the waterline, due to the projecting shelf of an iceberg."

Nevertheless, this writer emphasizes, "Had the Titanic been running under a slow bell, she would probably have been afloat today." Even that deadly underwater blow, we are told, "would scarcely have been fatal had the ship been put, as she should have been, under half speed."

In that case, "the force of the reactive blow would have been reduced to one-quarter." To quote the following explanation:

"The energy of a moving mass increases with the velocity's square. The 60,000-ton Titanic, at 21 knots, represented the energy of 1,161,000 foot tons. At 10 knots, the Titanic would have reduced her power to 290,250 foot tons.

Think of it: that giant vessel, rushing on through the ice-infested waters, was capable of striking a blow equal to the combined broadsides of the twenty 12-inch guns of the USS Delaware and USS North Dakota, each of whose guns developed 50,000 foot-tons at the muzzle!

"Newton's first law of motion 'will be served." "But had the speed been only one-half and the energy one-fourth as great, the force might have well deflected the ship from the iceberg before more than two or three of her compartments had been ripped open, and with the water confined to these, the powerful pumps could have kept the vessel afloat for many hours, and surely until a fleet of rescuing ships had taken every soul from the stricken vessel."

This writer has no patience with the contention that a ship like the Titanic couldn't carry enough lifeboats for all on board. He has studied the problem and presented its solution in the accompanying diagram.

In its editorial summarizing the "Lessons of the Titanic's Loss," the Army and Navy Journal (New York) makes special mention of the value of the life raft, the need for more competent seamen, better appliances for launching boats, "a steam—or gasoline-propelled pinnace," and searchlights.

It also calls attention to a letter from Admiral Robert E. Peary. In Admiral Peary's opinion:

"A powerful searchlight would greatly assist in determining the presence of icebergs in a ship's course in clear weather" but would be useless in a fog.

Large icebergs, he says, are easily located and avoided. But "the most dangerous ice menace to a steamer is the last remaining fragment of a berg, usually a mass of dense translucent ice, hard as a rock, almost entirely submerged, absorbing the color of the surrounding water, and almost invisible, even in broad daylight, until close aboard."

A steel passenger ship, striking one of these "growlers," would likely have "her bilge torn open from bow to quarter. For our huge modern steel steamships, traveling at high speed and intensely vulnerable to puncture, there is no absolute protection against icebergs except to give the region where they may occur the widest berth."

Lewis Nixon, the shipbuilder, believes that some of the difficulties in providing sufficient lifeboats are real. Still, he suggests life rafts and a detachable deck.

Admiral F. E. Chadwick, in a letter to the New York Evening Post, also recommends the raft. He discusses the question of the Titanic's size, speed, and construction but concludes thus:

"Certainly, her size had nothing to do with her loss, and her speed was less than others. She was lost by unwise navigation—by running at full speed, though so amply forewarned, into a dangerous situation that the Titanic might have easily avoided. Any ship driven at such speed onto a berg of such character would have torn her bottom to pieces. This is a fundamental, sad, and important fact. It accounts for everything."

"Science and Invention: Experts on the 'Titanic' Wreck," in The Literary Digest, New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, Vol. XLIV, No. 19, Whole No. 1151, 11 May 1912, p. 981-983.

Key Points

1. The Nature of the Collision with the Iceberg:

   • According to Scientific American, the most likely cause of the Titanic's sinking was a "massive, projecting underwater shelf of the iceberg" that tore open several of the ship's compartments from the bow to amidships. The article compares the energy released by the collision to the combined firepower of battleships, underscoring the immense force involved.

2. Criticism of Speed and Navigational Decisions:

   • Experts argue that the Titanic’s speed was a significant factor in the disaster. Had the ship been traveling at a reduced speed, such as half-speed, it might have survived the impact. The article emphasizes that the energy of a moving mass increases with the square of its velocity, suggesting that even a powerful ship like the Titanic could have avoided sinking with more prudent navigation.

3. Analysis of the Titanic’s Construction:

   • The Scientific American provides a detailed description of the Titanic's robust construction, including its double bottom, multiple watertight compartments, and powerful pumps. Despite these features, the article argues that no ship, regardless of size or construction, is immune to the kind of long, glancing blow the iceberg dealt below the waterline.
   • It further elaborates on how the Titanic's size was expected to offer security against sinking, but this assumption proved fatally flawed due to the specific nature of the iceberg collision.

4. Repositioning of Steamship Routes:

   • In response to the disaster, transatlantic steamship lines, in collaboration with the United States Hydrographic Office, quickly agreed to reposition summer routes farther south to avoid iceberg-prone areas. This change was seen as a necessary safety measure to prevent future collisions in ice-laden waters.
   • A chart included in the article shows the new routes, emphasizing the proactive steps taken by the shipping industry to ensure safer navigation.

5. Recommendations for Improved Safety Measures:

   • Experts like Admiral Robert E. Peary and shipbuilder Lewis Nixon suggest various improvements, including deploying powerful searchlights, carrying life rafts, and introducing detachable decks for additional safety. These recommendations reflect a broader call for enhanced safety equipment and protocols.
   • The article also highlights the need for more competent seamen, better lifeboat launching appliances, and enforcing a wider berth around areas where icebergs are commonly found.

6. Challenging the Notion of "Unsinkable":

   • The disaster of the Titanic shattered the belief in the concept of the "unsinkable ship." While the Titanic’s builders and owners had many reasons to believe in the ship’s safety, the combination of factors—speed, iceberg conditions, and a critical navigational error—proved otherwise.

Summary

The article "Expert Opinions on What Happened - 1912" provides a comprehensive look at the varying expert analyses of the RMS Titanic disaster. It emphasizes that while the ship's construction was state-of-the-art, no vessel could withstand the unique underwater blow delivered by an iceberg at high speed. Experts criticize the decisions made regarding the Titanic's speed and navigation, arguing that these choices played a central role in the ship's fate. The article also covers the immediate responses from the maritime industry, including route changes and recommendations for enhanced safety protocols and equipment. The collective opinions highlight a fundamental shift in understanding the vulnerabilities of modern ships and the pressing need for reform to ensure passenger safety on future voyages.

Conclusion

The sinking of the RMS Titanic remains a stark reminder of the limits of human ingenuity in the face of nature's power. As the article "Expert Opinions on What Happened - 1912" illustrates, a combination of factors—engineering, navigational errors, and environmental conditions—contributed to one of history's deadliest maritime disasters. The expert opinions gathered in this article challenge the notion of invulnerability, even in the most technologically advanced ships, and call for critical changes in maritime safety practices. The Titanic disaster was a turning point, compelling the maritime industry and authorities to rethink their approach to safety, navigation, and emergency preparedness. The insights provided here continue to serve as a foundation for ongoing improvements in ocean travel, emphasizing caution, preparedness, and respect for the forces of nature.